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Prominent  among  the  many  competing  explana- 
tions  that  have  been  advanced  to  account  for  foreign 
exchange  rate  movements  in  the  post-Bretton  Woods 
era  of  floating  exchange  rates  is  the  so-called  pur- 
chasing  power  parity  (PPP)  theory.  One  of  the 
most  popular,  simple,  and  durable  explanations  of 
exchange  rate  behavior,  the  purchasing  power  parity 
doctrine  holds  that  currencies  are  valued  for  what 
they  will  buy.  Therefore  the  relative  external  value 
of  two  currencies,  i.e.,  the  exchange  rate  between 
them,  is determined  by  their  relative  internal  purchas- 
ing  powers  as  measured  by  the  ratio  of  the  general 
price  levels  in  the  two  countries  concerned.  From 
this  it  follows  that  changes  in  relative  national  price 
levels  determine  changes  in  the  exchange  rate.  In 
particular,  the  theory  predicts  that  the  percentage 
rate  of change  of  the  exchange  rate  will  tend  to  equal 
the  differential  between  the  relative  rates  of  price 
inflation  at  home  and  abroad.  Thus  if  the  domestic 
rate  of  inflation  in  the  U.  S.  is,  say,  five  percentage 
points  higher  than  the  comparable  rate  of  inflation  in 
Switzerland,  the  theory  maintains  that  the  dollar  will 
tend  to  depreciate  on  the  foreign  exchanges  at  a  rate 
of five  percent  relative  to  the  Swiss  franc.  It  follows 
from  the  theory  that  the  way  to  strengthen  a  cur- 
rency’s  external  value  is  to  strengthen  its  internal 
value  by  reducing  the  domestic  rate  of  inflation.  In 
terms  of  the  preceding  example,  the  way  to  arrest 
the  fall  of  the  dollar  relative  to  the  Swiss  franc  is  to 
bring  the  U.  S.  rate  of  inflation  down  into  equality 
with  the  lower  Swiss  rate.  With  both  currencies 
experiencing  the  same  rate  of  inflation  (or  fall  in 
internal  purchasing  power),  their  relative  purchasing 
power  will  remain  unchanged  and  the  exchange  rate 
will  stabilize. 
The  foregoing  view  is  scarcely  new.  Rather  it  is 
the  product  of  at  least 175  years  of  past  theorizing 
about  the  connection  between  money,  prices,  and 
exchange  rates.  It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that 
the  PPP  doctrine  has  attracted  the  attention  of  some 
of  the  leading  monetary  theorists  of  all  time,  includ- 
ing  Thornton,  Wheatley,  Ricardo,  Marshall,  Cassel, 
von  Mises,  Keynes,  and  Viner.  As  proponents  or 
critics,  these  economists  helped  formulate,  develop, 
modify,  and  refine  the  central  analytical  propositions 
of  the  PPP  doctrine.  The  purpose  of  this  article  is 
to  identify  and  explain  these  propositions,  to  trace 
their  development  in the  history  of  economic  thought, 
and  to  indicate  the  extent  of  their  survival  in modern 
versions  of  the  theory. 
What  is  the  PPP  Doctrine?  In  essence,  the  PPP 
doctrine  is a theory  of  the  determination  of  the  nomi- 
nal  exchange  rate  and  its  movements  in  long-run 
equilibrium  when  the  trade  balance  is  zero  and  the 
real  barter  terms  of  trade  and  its  underlying  real 
determinants  are  presumed  to  be  constant.  Given 
these  conditions  and  assuming  that  all  goods  are 
exportables,  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate  can  be 
expressed  as  the  product  of  the  terms  of  trade  and 
relative  general  price  levels,  respectively.  In  symbols, 
(1) E=TP/P* 
where  E  is  the  exchange  rate  (defined  as  the  do- 
mestic  currency  price  of  a  unit  of  foreign  currency), 
T  the  terms  of  trade  (defined  as  the  real  export  cost 
per  unit  of  imports,  i.e.,  the  quantity  of  exports 
given  up  to  obtain  a  unit  of  imports),  P  the  home 
country  price  level,  and  P*  the  foreign  price  level.1 
Via  an  appropriate  choice  of  units,  the  terms-of- 
trade  variable  can  be  normalized  and  set  equal  to 
unity.  This  step  permits  the  PPP  theory  to  be  stated 
conventionally  in  its  so-called  absolute  and  relative 
versions. 
The  absolute  version  of  the  doctrine  states  that 
the  equilibrium  exchange  rate  will  equal  the  ratio  of 
domestic  to  foreign  general  price  levels,  i.e., 
(2)  E  =  P/P*. 
1 The  derivation  of  Equation  1  is  particularly  simple  in 
the  case  where  each  country  produces  only  one  good, 
part  of  which  it  exports  to  the  other.  Trade  balance 
Equilibrium  requires  that  the  total  value  of  each  country’s 
exports  must  exactly  equal  the  total  value  of  its  imports 
measured  in  terms  of  the  same  money.  For  the  home 
country,  this  condition  can  be  expressed  as  QP  = 
Q*P*E,  where  Q  is  the  quantity  of  physical  exports  of 
the  home  country,  Q*  the  physical  quantity  of  its  imports 
(i.e.,  the  quantity  of  the  foreign  country’s  exports),  P 
the  home  currency  price  of  home  country  product,  P* 
the  foreign  currency  price  of  foreign  country  product,  and 
E  the  exchange  rate  defined  as  the  home  currency  price 
of  a  unit  of  foreign  currency.  This  expression  says  that 
the  values  (quantity  times  price)  of  exports  and  imports 
are  the  same  measured  in  terms  of  the  home  country’s 
money.  Solving  this  expression  for  the  exchange  rate 
yields  E  =  (Q/Q*)(P/P*),  where  the  first  term  on  the 
right  hand  side  is  the  real  terms  of  trade,  i.e.,  the  quantity 
of  exports  given  up  to  obtain  a unit  of  imports.  Denoting 
the  terms  of  trade  variable  as  T,  the  foregoing  expression 
reduces  to  E  =  T  P/P*,  which  is  Equation  1 of  the  text. 
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way,  arguing  that  since  currencies  are  valued  for 
what  they  will  buy,  the  exchange  rate  between  them 
must  equal  their  relative  internal  purchasing  powers 
measured  by  relative  general  price  levels. 
The  relative  version  of  the  doctrine  states  that 
changes  in  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate  will  equal 
changes  in  the  ratio  of  general  price  levels,  or,  more 
generally,  that  the  percentage  rate  of  change  of  the 
exchange  rate  will  equal  the  differential  between  the 
percentage  rates  of  price  inflation  at  home  and 
abroad.  In  symbols,  the  relative  version  is 
(3)  e  =  p-p* 
where  the  lower-case  letters  denote  percentage  rates 
of  change  of  the  variables  in  Equation  2. 
The  foregoing  brief  statement  of  the  doctrine,  how- 
ever,  is  hardly  sufficient.  More  than  just  the  bare 
conclusion  that  the  exchange  rate  and  its  movements 
tend  to  equal  relative  national  price  levels  and  their 
movements,  the  doctrine  also  consists  of  a  number  of 
interrelated  propositions  that  support  that  conclusion. 
The  most  important  of  these  propositions  refer  to 
(1)  the  international  equalization  of  price  levels 
measured  in  terms  of  a  common  currency,  (2)  the 
corresponding  international  equalization  of  the  value 
of  money,  (3)  the  stability  of  PPP  equilibrium,  (4) 
the  neutrality  of  equilibrium  exchange  rate  changes, 
and  (5)  the  causal  role  of  money.  Taken  together 
these  propositions  constitute  the  central  analytical 
core  of  the  PPP  doctrine. 
Price  Level  Equalization  The  first  proposition 
states  that  the  equilibrium  floating  exchange  rate 
must  equalize  foreign  and  home  country  general  price 
levels  measured  in  terms  of  a  common  currency  unit 
at  the  rate  of  exchange.  General  prices  must  be 
equalized  across  countries  because  if  they  were  not, 
goods  would  be  a  bargain  in  one  country  compared 
to  the  other.  Everybody  would  want  to  buy  in  the 
low-price  country  and  sell  in the  high-price  one.  The 
resulting  excess  demand  for  the  currency  of  the 
former  and  the  corresponding  excess  supply  of  the 
currency  of  the  latter  would  force  the  exchange  rate 
into  PPP  equilibrium  thereby  eliminating  the  price 
disparity. 
That  the  condition  of  price  equalization  is  implied 
by  PPP  can  be  seen  by  rearranging  Equation  2  to 
read  P  =  EP*,  which  says  that  home  and  foreign 
price  levels  are  the  same  when  expressed  in  terms  of 
home  currency  units  at  the  equilibrium  rate  of  ex- 
change.  Likewise,  price  levels  are  also  the  same  when 
expressed  in  foreign  currency  units  as  can  be  seen  by 
arranging  the  equation  to  read  P/E  =  P*.  In  short, 
the  PPP  doctrine  implies  that  a representative  bundle 
of  goods  will  cost  the  same  everywhere  measured  in 
terms  of  either  money.  Neither  country  will  enjoy  a 
price  advantage  over  the  other  at  the  PPP  exchange 
rate.  Nor  will  residents  of  either  country  be  able  to 
purchase  goods  more  cheaply  at  home  with  local 
currency  than  abroad  after  converting  local  into  for- 
eign  currency.  Neglecting  transport  costs,  Londoners 
will  find  goods  to  be  as  cheap  in  New  York  as  in 
London  and  vice  versa  for  New  Yorkers. 
Equalization  of  the  Value  of  Money  A  second 
PPP  proposition  refers  to  the  international  equali- 
zation  of  the  value  (purchasing  power)  of  money. 
According  to  the  PPP  doctrine,  the  equilibrium 
value  of  money  must  be  everywhere  the  same.  For 
if  it  were  not,  people  would  demand  more  of  the 
high-  and  less  of  the  low-purchasing  power  money 
on  the  market  for  foreign  exchange.  The  resulting 
excess  demand  for  the  former  money  and  the  corre- 
sponding  excess  supply  of  the  latter  would  cause  the 
exchange  rate  between  the  two  moneys  to  adjust 
until  purchasing  power  was  equalized  and  both 
money  stocks  were  willingly  held,  Equalization  of the 
value  of  money  across  countries  is therefore  a  neces- 
sary  prerequisite  of  international  monetary  equilib- 
rium.  For  only  if  such  equalization  prevails  would 
there  be  no  inducement  to  switch  from  one  currency 
to  the  other.  Only  then  will  both  money  stocks  be 
willingly  held  and  the  markets  for  money  balances  in 
both  countries  be  cleared  simultaneously. 
Note  that  equalization  of  the  value  of  money  is the 
exact  counterpart  of  price  level  equalization.  By 
definition,  the  value  of  money  is nothing  other  than 
its  purchasing  power  over  goods.  And  since  the 
purchasing  power  of  money  in  terms  of  a  represen- 
tative  market  basket  of  goods  is  simply  the  inverse 
of  the  general  price  level  l/P,  it  follows  that  equali- 
zation  of  price  levels  automatically  implies  equaliza- 
tion  of  the  value  of  money.  That  is,  when  PPP 
prevails,  any  currency  tends  to  command  roughly 
the  same  amount  of goods  and  services  whether  spent 
at  home  or  converted  into  foreign  currency  at  the 
equilibrium  rate  of  exchange  and  then  spent  abroad. 
Thus  a  dollar  will  purchase  no  more  in  the  U.  S. 
than  it  will  buy  in  the  U.  K.  after  conversion  into 
pounds  sterling  at  the  equilibrium  rate  of  exchange 
and  vice  versa  for  sterling. 
Stability  of  Equilibrium  A  third  proposition 
refers  to  the  stability  of  PPP  equilibrium.  Regard- 
ing  stability,  the  PPP  doctrine  contends  that  when 
the  actual  rate  of  exchange  deviates  from  the  PPP 
equilibrium,  automatic  responses  tend  to  eliminate 
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With  respect  to  disturbances  to  equilibrium,  the  PPP 
theory  readily  admits  a  host  of  factors-real  shocks, 
expectations,  speculation,  capital  flows  and  the  like- 
that  may  cause  the  exchange  rate  to  deviate  tempo- 
rarily  from  PPP.  But  it  also  describes  strong  sta- 
bilizing  pressures  that  work  to  correct  such  deviations 
and  push  the  exchange  rate  back  toward  equilibrium. 
More  specifically,  the  doctrine  postulates  an  auto- 
matic  self-correcting  mechanism  that  keeps  the  actual 
exchange  rate  hovering  close  to  its  equilibrium  level. 
This  mechanism  relies  on  the  corrective  influence  of 
price-induced  shifts  in  international  trade  and  the 
associated  shifts  in  the  demand  for  and  supply  of 
foreign  exchange.  For  example,  suppose  the  dollar 
price  of  the  pound  falls  below  its  PPP  equilibrium. 
On  the  market  for  foreign  exchange,  the  pound  is 
now  undervalued  and  the  dollar  overvalued  relative 
to  their  actual  internal  purchasing  powers.  The 
undervalued  pound  makes  British  goods  seem  under- 
priced  to  Americans  whose  eagerness  to  purchase 
them  deluges  the  foreign  exchanges  with  dollars  seek- 
ing  to  buy  pounds.  Conversely,  the  overvalued 
dollar  makes  American  goods  appear  overpriced  to 
Britons  whose  reluctance  to  buy  them  dries  up  the 
supply  of  pounds  seeking  to  buy  dollars.  The  result- 
ing  surplus  of  dollars  and  the  corresponding  shortage 
of  pounds  would  quickly  bid  the  exchange  rate  back 
to  PPP  where  the  external  and  internal  values  of  the 
currencies  correspond.  Via  this  self-adjusting  mech- 
anism  the  actual  exchange  rate  would  tend  toward  its 
equilibrium  value,  i.e.,  the  exchange  rate  would  tend 
to  hover  about  the  PPP. 
Neutrality  of  Exchange  Rate  Changes  A  fourth 
tenet  of  the  PPP  doctrine  is  that  equilibrium  ex- 
change  rate  movements  that  merely  reflect  differ- 
ential  inflation  rates  have  no  effect  on  real  variables 
such  as  exports,  imports,  the  trade  balance,  or  the 
terms  of  trade.  These  real  variables  are  determined 
by  real  (exchange  rate-adjusted)  relative  prices. 
According  to  Equation  2,  however,  the  real  relative 
price  term  P/EP*  is  a  fixed  constant  equal  to  one. 
This  means  that  movements  in  the  equilibrium  ex- 
change  rate  exactly  offset  changes  in  the  nominal 
price  ratio  P/P*,  thereby  preserving  the  real  terms 
of  trade  between  foreign  and  domestic  goods. 
For  example,  Equation  2  says  that  a  doubling  of 
domestic  prices  relative  to  foreign  prices  will  be  ac- 
companied  by  a  corresponding  doubling  of  the  ex- 
change  rate  leaving  real  (exchange  rate-deflated) 
relative  prices  unaltered.  Since  the  real  relative 
price  of  domestic  goods  compared  with  foreign  goods 
is  the  same  after  inflation  as  before,  the  general  rise 
in  domestic  prices  will  not  affect  imports  or  exports. 
The  physical  quantities  of  those  variables  will  be  the 
same  as  originally  and  only  the  monetary  units  in 
which  they  are  measured  will  have  changed.  In 
short,  the  PPP  doctrine  holds  that  exchange  rate 
movements  serve  the  purpose  of  offsetting  differential 
rates  of  inflation  and  thus  leave  real  relative  prices 
and  all  real  variables  undisturbed.  Provided  the  ex- 
change  rate  corresponds  to  PPP,  its  changes  will  not 
affect  real  economic  magnitudes.  Being  perfectly 
synchronized  with  price  movements,  such  exchange 
rate  changes  are  entirely  neutral  in  their  impact  on 
the  real  economy. 
Causal  Role  of  Money  The  fifth  proposition 
refers  to  the  direction  of  causality  between  price 
levels  and  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate.  Although 
strictly  speaking  the  PPP  price-exchange  rate 
equality  is  an  equilibrium  condition  between  two 
endogenous  variables,  it  is  often  interpreted  as  a 
cause  and  effect  relationship.  Causation  is  typically 
viewed  as  running  from  price  levels  to  the  exchange 
rate  rather  than  vice  versa.  In  particular,  many  PPP 
theorists  argue  that,  in  the  long  run  when  the  deter- 
minants  of  the  demand  for  money  have  stabilized  at 
their  steady-state  equilibrium  values,  national  money 
stacks  determine  national  price  levels  which  in  turn 
determine  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate.  If  true, 
this  means  that  the  ultimate  determinant  of  the  equi- 
librium  exchange  rate  is  relative  national  money 
stacks  and  that  the  exchange  rate  moves  over  time 
as  the  differential  in  the  growth  rates  of  the  money 
stocks.  It  also  means  that  depreciation  of  the  equi- 
librium  exchange  rate  is a consequence  rather  than  a 
cause  of  domestic  inflation. 
Henry  Thornton  and  the  Origin  of  the  PPP  Doc- 
trine  The  foregoing  propositions  are  hardly  new. 
They  were  enunciated  early  in  the  19th  century  to 
explain  the  behavior  of  the  floating  paper  pound 
following  Britain’s  suspension  of  the  gold  converti- 
bility  of  its  currency  in  1797.  Henry  Thornton 
(1760-1515)  was  the  first  economist  to  clearly  ex- 
plain  the  operation  of  the  self-adjusting  mechanism 
that  keeps  the  exchange  rate  close  to  its  purchasing 
power  par.  In  his  classic  The  Paper  Credit  of  Great 
Britain  (1802)  he  argued  that  a  rise  in  the  price 
level  in  a  country  with  an  excess  stack  of  paper 
money  would  automatically  produce  a  roughly 
equivalent  rise  in  the  exchange  rate.  He  explained 
how  a  rise  in  British  prices  relative  to  foreign  prices 
would,  at the  preexisting  exchange  rate,  make  foreign 
goods  seem  relatively  cheap  to  the  British  whose 
desire  to  acquire  them  would  increase  the  supply  of 
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same  time,  British  goods  would  become  relatively 
expensive  to  foreigners  whose  unwillingness  to  pur- 
chase  them  would  reduce  the  supply  of  foreign  cur- 
rency  seeking  to  buy  pounds.  The  resulting  excess 
supply  of  pounds  and  the  corresponding  excess  de- 
mand  for  foreign  money  would  immediately  bid  the 
exchange  rate  up  to  the  new  PPP  equilibrium  con- 
sistent  with  the  higher  level  of  British  prices.  [11, 
pp.  198-9] 
Thornton  was  also  the  first  to  advance  the  notion 
of  the  neutrality  of  equilibrium  exchange  rate 
changes.  He  noted  that  the  rise  in  British  prices 
would  not  act  as  an  obstacle  to  British  exports  be- 
cause  the  corresponding  change  in  the  equilibrium 
exchange  rate  would  “obviate  the  dearness  of  our 
articles”  and  “serve  as  a  compensation  to  the  for- 
eigner”  for  the  higher  price  of  British  goods.  In  this 
manner,  he  said,  the  offsetting  rise  in  the  exchange 
rate  would  “prevent  the  high  price  of  goods  in  Great 
Britain  from  producing  that  unfavourable  balance  of 
trade,  which,  for  the  sake  of  illustrating  the  subject 
was  supposed  to  exist.”  [11,  p.  199]  Here  is  the 
origin  of  the  proposition  that  PPP  exchange  rate 
changes  cannot  affect  real  variables  like  the  balance 
of  trade  since  they  merely  offset  divergent  nominal 
inflation  rates  and  thus  leave  real  (exchange  rate- 
adjusted)  relative  prices  unaltered. 
John  Wheatley  Thornton’s  discussion  of  PPP 
took  the  foreign  money  stock  and  price  level  as given 
constants.  On  this  basis  he  concluded  that  the  equi- 
librium  exchange  rate  moves  with  the  domestic  price 
level  alone.  His  contemporary  John  Wheatley  (1772 
1830),  however,  extended  his  analysis  by  considering 
variations  in  money  and  prices  abroad  as  well  as 
domestically.  Wheatley  concluded  that  the  relative 
quantity  of  money  operating  through  genera1  prices 
is  the  sole  determinant  of  the  exchange  rate  so  that 
the  latter  varies  in strict  proportion  to  relative  money 
stocks.  He  reached  this  conclusion  via  the  following 
route. 
First,  he  asserted  that  “the  course  of  exchange  is 
exclusively  governed  by  the  relative  state  of  prices, 
or  the  relative  value  of  money,  in  the  different  coun- 
tries  between  whom  it  is  negotiated.”  [13,  p.  85] 
This,  of  course,  is  the  absolute  version  of  the  PPP 
theory  stating  that  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate 
equals  the  ratio  of  domestic  to  foreign  price  levels 
according  to  the  relationship 
(4)  E  =  P/P*. 
Second,  he  argued  that  under  purely  paper  mone- 
tary  standards  the  level  of  prices  in  each  country 
varies  in  strict  proportion  to  the  quantity  of  money. 
This,  of  course,  is  the  rigid  version  of  the  quantity 
theory  of  money  which  may  be  expressed  as 
(5)  P  =  kM  and  P*  =  k*M* 
where  M  is  the  money  stock,  k  is  a  constant  coeffi- 
cient  equal  to  the  ratio  of  the  circulation  velocity  of 
money  to  real  output  (both  variables  treated  as  fixed 
constants  by  Wheatley),  and  the  asterisks  denote 
foreign  country  variables. 
Third,  he  substituted  Equation  5  into  Equation  4. 
This  gave  him  the  result  that  the  exchange  rate  varies 
in  strict  proportion  with  relative  money  supplies,  i.e., 
sitions  of  the  PPP  doctrine.  Regarding  the  directic 
of  causation  between  price  levels  and  exchange  rate 
he  asserts  that  “variation  in the  state  of  the  exchange 
(6)  E  =  kM/k*M*  =  K(M/M*) 
where  K  is  the  ratio  of  the  constants  k  and  k*.  He 
stated  this  result  when  he  declared  that  “the  course 
of  exchange  is  the  exclusive  criterion  of  how  far  the 
currency  of  one  country  is  increased  beyond  the  cur 
rency  of  another.”  [14,  p.  207] 
Wheatley  commented  at  length  on  the  key  propo- 
. . . is  the  effect,  not  the  cause”  of  variation  in  price 
levels.  [13,  p.  88]  With  respect  to  equalization  of 
price  levels  and  the  value  of  money  he  asserted  that 
“prices  are  everywhere  the  same”  and  that  money 
serves  “as  a  uniform  measure  of  value  over  the 
whole  world.”  [13,  p.  59]  Two  things,  he  said, 
operate  to  ensure  price  equalization  across  countries. 
The  first  is  exchange  rate  adjustment,  which  equal- 
izes  the  common  currency  value  of  any  given  local 
currency  price  levels.  The  second  is commodity  arbi- 
trage,  which  equalizes  the  common  currency  prices  of 
internationally  traded  goods  at  any  given  exchange 
rate.  Regarding  the  equalization  of  prices  by  com- 
modity  arbitrage,  he  contended  that  the  openness  of 
modern  national  economies  rendered  the  law  of  one 
price  applicable  to  general  price  levels  as  well  as  to 
the  specific  prices  of  internationally  traded  goods. 
As  he  put  it, 
The  facility  with  which  the  reciprocal  communica- 
tions  of  nations  is  carried  on  has  a  necessary 
influence  on  the  markets  of  all,  and  approximates 
the  price  of  their  produce  to  a  general  level.  [13, 
p.  45] 
Nevertheless,  he  insisted  that  the  essence  of  the  PPP 
concept  consists  of  more  than  just  the  law  of  one 
price.  Specifically,  he  interpreted  PPP  as a condition 
of  international  monetary  equilibrium  in  which  the 
value  of  money  is  equalized  across  countries  and  ex- 
change  rate  variations  are  the  means  by  which  this 
result  is  achieved.  That  this  is  indeed  his  view  is 
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change  constitutes  the  practical  means,  by  which 
money  is  enabled  to  discharge  its  functions  over  the 
whole  world  as  a  uniform  measure  of  value.”  [13, 
p.  25]  To  Wheatley  the  central  role  of  the  exchange 
rate  is  to  clear  all  markets  for  money  balances  by 
equalizing  the  internal  purchasing  power  of  various 
currencies.  It  therefore  follows  that 
fluctuations  in  the  exchange  exclusively  arise  from 
the  efforts  of  the  different  individuals  of  different 
countries  to  reduce  their  respective  currencies  to 
the  same  relative  amount  for  the  purpose  of  main- 
taining  the  general  equivalency  [of  purchasing 
power].  [13,  p.  25] 
Wheatley  also  discussed  the  stability  of  PPP  equi- 
librium  and  the  neutrality  of  equilibrium  exchange 
rate  changes.  His  treatment  of  these  issues  is among 
the  more  rigid  and  uncompromising  in  the  literature. 
Regarding  temporary  deviations  from  PPP,  he  flatly 
denied  they  could  occur.  In  his  view,  the  exchange 
rate  is  always  at  its  equilibrium  level  and  thus  it  is 
impossible  for  currencies  to  be  temporarily  over-  or 
undervalued  on  the  market  for  foreign  exchange.  In 
other  words,  the  self-equilibrating  mechanism  works 
perfectly  and  instantaneously  to  maintain  the  ex- 
change  rate  at  its  PPP  equilibrium.  Here  is  a  su- 
preme  example  of  Wheatley’s  tendency  to  apply  the 
PPP  theory  of  long-run  equilibrium  to  the  short  run 
as  well.  This  tendency  is  also  manifest  in  his  treat- 
ment  of  the  neutrality  issue.  Regarding  neutrality, 
he  argues  that,  because  the  exchange  rate  is  always 
in  equilibrium,  its  fluctuations  will  not  affect  trade 
in  the  slightest. 
To  summarize,  Wheatley’s  version  of  the  PPP 
doctrine  is among  the  more  extreme  in  the  history  of 
monetary  analysis.  Not  only  did  he  argue  that  the 
exchange  rate  is determined  solely  by  relative  money 
supplies  operating  through  relative  price  levels,  he 
also  emphatically  denied  that  real  shocks  could  ever 
affect  the  exchange  rate.  His  position  was  that  such 
shocks,  by  affecting  real  national  incomes,  would 
immediately  alter  each  country’s  demand  for  the 
other’s  product  sufficient  to  maintain  equilibrium  in 
the  trade  balance  and  the  exchange  rate.  For  ex- 
ample,  he  argued  that  a  domestic  crop  failure  requir- 
ing  increased  food  imports  would,  by  reducing  British 
real  income  and  capacity  to  purchase,  tend  to  force  a 
compensating  contraction  of  nonfood  imports  leaving 
the  trade  balance  undisturbed.  Conversely,  if  imports 
were  not  curtailed  the  resulting  rise  in  British  pur- 
chases  from  abroad  would  itself  increase  the  income 
of  foreign  exporters  and  so  their  demand  for  British 
goods.  Exports  would  rise  to  match  imports  thus 
leaving  the  trade  balance  and  the  exchange  rate  un- 
disturbed.  Either  way,  adjustment  would  occur 
frictionlessly  through  income  changes  without  affect- 
ing  the  exchange  rate.2  By  ruling  out  real  disturb- 
ances,  Wheatley  was  able  to  assert  that  the  exchange 
rate  never  deviates  even  momentarily  from  PPP  and 
that  causation  runs  in  a  strict  unidirectional  channel 
from  money  to  prices  to  the  exchange  rate.  In  his 
view,  exchange  rate  movements  are  always  and  every- 
where  solely  a  monetary  phenomenon. 
Others  adhering  to  this  extreme  monetarist  version 
of  the  PPP  doctrine  were  David  Ricardo  (1772- 
1823)  and  Walter  Boyd  (17641837).  They  too 
denied  that  real  shocks  could  affect  the  exchange 
rate  even  temporarily.  Such  shocks  they  regarded 
as  automatically  and  instantaneously  self-correcting 
having  no  impact  on  the  exchange  rate.  That  is, 
they  simply  assumed  that  the  slightest  real  pressure 
on the  exchange  rate  would,  by  making  British  goods 
cheaper  to  foreigners,  result  in  an  immediate  expan- 
sion  of  exports  sufficient  to  eliminate  the  pressure.3 
In  their  view  the  exchange  rate  is always  at  the  PPP 
equilibrium  determined  by  relative  money  stocks,  and 
rises  in  the  exchange  rate  are  solely  and  completely 
the  result  of  an  overissue  of  currency.  Conse- 
quently  they  regarded  exchange  rate  depreciation, 
together  with  the  premium  on gold  bullion,  as consti- 
tuting  both  proof  and  measure  of  excessive  money 
creation.  In  other  words,  if  the  exchange  rate 
is  5  percent  above  its  old  gold  standard  par,  then 
this  is  prima  facie  evidence  that  the  money  stock  is 
also  5 percent  in  excess  of  its  nonflationary  level  and 
should  be  contracted. 
The  PPP  doctrine  also  appears  in  the  famous 
Bullion  Report  (1810)  where  it  is  expressed  in  the 
following  words. 
In  the  event  of  the  prices  of  commodities  being 
raised  in  one  country  by  an  augmentation  of  its 
circulating  medium,  while  no  similar  augmentation 
in the  circulating  medium of  a neighboring  country 
has  led  to  a  similar  rise  in  prices,  the  currencies 
of the  two countries  will  no longer  continue  to  bear 
the  same  relative  value  to  each  other  as  before. 
The  exchange  will  be  computed  between  these  two 
countries  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  former.  [6, 
quoted  in  1, p.  91] 
Like  Ricardo  and  Boyd,  the  Bullion  Report  concludes 
that  exchange  rate  movements,  together  with  the 
premium  on  gold  bullion,  “form  the  best  general 
criterion  from  which  any  inference  can  be  drawn  as 
to  the  sufficiency  or  excess  of  paper  currency  in  cir- 
culation.”  [6,  quoted  in  1, p.  91] 
2 Regarding  Wheatley’s  notion  of  the  frictionless  income 
adjustment  mechanism  see  Fetter  [4,  p.  47],  Metzler  [8, 
p.  217],  O’Brien  [10,  p.  149],  and  Viner  [12,  pp.  138-9, 
295-7]. 
3 On  this  point  see  Fetter  [4,  p.  47],  Metzler  [8,  p.  217], 
and  O’Brien  [10,  p.  149]. 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK  OF  RICHMOND  7 Gustav  Cassel  The  preceding  has  specified  the 
key  propositions  of  the  PPP  theory  and  has  traced 
their  origin  to  Thornton  and  Wheatley  in  the  early 
1800’s.  For  the  classic  statement  of  these  proposi- 
tions,  however,  it  is necessary  to  turn  to  the  writings 
of  the  Swedish  economist  Gustav  Cassel  during  and 
immediately  following  World  War  I.  It  was  Cassel 
who  introduced  the  phrase  “purchasing  power  parity” 
into  the  literature.  He  did  so  when  he  resurrected 
the  theory  to  explain  the  behavior  of  the  dislocated 
European  exchanges  during  the  war  and  afterward 
in  the  hyperinflation  episodes  in  the  early  1920’s. 
His  forceful  and  systematic  exposition  of  the  theory 
was  largely  responsible  for  the  popularity  it  enjoyed 
in  the  1920’s.  His  contributions  to  the  doctrine  in- 
clude  the  following. 
First,  as  previously  mentioned,  he  christened  the 
theory  with  the  name  it  bears  today.  Second,  he 
clarified  the  concept  of  the  PPP  exchange  rate,  de- 
fining  it  in  its  absolute  version  as  “the  quotient 
between  the  general  levels  of  prices  in  the  two  coun- 
tries”  and  in  its  relative  version  as  “the  old  rate 
multiplied  by  the  quotient  of  the  degree  of  inflation” 
in  both  countries.  [2,  p.  62;  3,  p.  140]  Third,  he 
redefined  the  somewhat  vague  notion  of  equalization 
of  the  value  of  money  to  mean  that  “a  certain  repre- 
sentative  quantity  of  commodities  must  cost  the  same 
in  both  countries,  if  the  exchange  rate  . . . stands  at 
its  equilibrium.”  [3,  p.  175]  He  points  out,  how- 
ever,  that  this  statement  is  strictly  true  only  if  the 
representative  market  basket  of  commodities  is  iden- 
tical  for  both  countries. 
Fourth,  he  reformulated  and  refined  the  neutrality 
proposition  in  the  following  words. 
the  purchasing  power  parity  represents  an 
indifferent  equilibrium  of  the  exchanges  in  the 
sense  that  it  does  not  affect  international  trade 
either  way.  Thus  a  country’s  export  is  not  checked 
by  low  rates  of  exchange?  provided  only  these  rates 
correspond  to  a  high  price  level  abroad,  or  a  low 
level  at  home;  nor  .  .  .  is  export  particularly 
stimulated  by  high  foreign  exchange  rates,  so  long 
as  they  only  correspond  to  the  relative  purchasing 
power  of  the  different  currencies.  Similarly,  low 
prices  of  foreign  currencies  do  not  mean  the  en- 
couragement  of  import  from  abroad  or  keener 
competition  for  the  home  producers,  so  long  as 
these  rates  are  merely  a  true  expression  for  the 
purchasing  power  parity  of  the  foreign  currencies. 
On  the  same  hypothesis  high  prices  of  foreign  cur- 
rencies  do  not  in  any  way  act  as  a  check  on  import. 
[3,  p.  157] 
Here  is  the  classic  statement  of  the  proposition  that 
PPP  exchange  rate  changes  leave  the  real  (inflation- 
adjusted)  exchange  rate  unaltered  and  so  do  not 
affect  real  exports  and  imports.  From  this  Cassel 
drew  the  practical  policy  conclusion  that  no  country 
could  increase  its  competitiveness  in  foreign  markets 
simply  by  deflating  its  price  level.  The  deflation,  he 
said,  will  be  matched  by  an  identical  fall  in  the 
equilibrium  exchange  rate,  leaving  the  real  exchange 
rate  and  hence  real  exports  unchanged.  [3,  p.  143] 
Cassel’s  fifth  contribution  was  his  identification  of 
the  sources  of  temporary  deviations  from  PPP  and 
his  description  of  the  self-correcting  mechanism  that 
operates  to  eliminate  such  deviations.  Regarding 
causes  of  temporary  deviations  from  PPP,  he  speci- 
fied  (1)  expectations  of  future  depreciation  of  the 
currency  owing  to  anticipations  of  future  inflationary 
money  growth,  (2)  speculation  against  the  currency, 
(3)  forced  sales  of  a  country’s  currency  abroad  at 
arbitrarily  low  prices,  (4)  failure  of  export  prices 
to  move  equiproportionally  with  general  prices  in 
response  to  monetary  shocks,  and  (5)  random  real 
disturbances  to  the  balance  of  payments.  For  all 
these  reasons,  he  notes,  a  country’s  currency  may  be 
temporarily  undervalued  on  the  foreign  exchanges. 
Regarding  the  operation  of  the  self-correcting  mech- 
anism  in  such  cases,  he  writes  that 
as  soon  as  a  country’s  currency  is  undervalued 
compared  with  its  purchasing  power  parity,  it  will 
be  of  peculiar  advantage  to  buy  this  currency,  and 
to  employ  the  money  thus  obtained  in  procuring 
commodities  from  that  country.  This  stimulus  thus 
applied  to  demand  will  necessarily  very  soon  raise 
the  price  of  the  currency  to  the  level  of  the  pur- 
chasing  power  parity.  [3,  p.  149] 
Conversely,  the  corresponding  overvaluation  of  the 
currency  of  the  other  country  will,  by  making  its 
goods  seem  overpriced  on  international  markets,  re- 
duce  the  demand  for  its  exports  and  thus  for  its  cur- 
rency.  If  country  A’s  currency  is  overvalued  and 
B’s  currency  undervalued,  then  the 
export  from  A  to  B  must  be  largely  checked  .  .  .  . 
At  the  same  time  the  import  from  B  to  A  would  be 
artificially  stimulated  by  such  a  valuation.  Indeed, 
both  these  influences  would  tend  to  raise  the  value 
of  B’s  currency  in  A,  and  to  restore  it  to  the  pur- 
chasing  power  parity,  which  shows  that  this  parity 
is  the  true  equilibrium  of  the  exchanges.  [3,  p. 
158] 
In  short,  deviations  from  PPP  affect  trade  flows  in a 
direction  that  counteracts  the  deviation  and  repre- 
sents  a corrective  to  it. 
Finally,  Cassel  elaborated  on  the  issue  of  price- 
exchange  rate  causality  and  its  implications.  Like 
Wheatley,  he  repeatedly  states  that  causation  runs 
from  price  levels  to  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate, 
i.e.,  that  the  latter  variable  is  “determined  by”  or 
“dependent  upon”  the  ratio  of  the  price  levels.  [3, 
pp.  141,  185,  186]  More  precisely,  he  invokes  the 
quantity  theory  of  money  to  assert  that  money  deter- 
mines  prices  which  in  turn  determine  the  exchange 
rate.  In  short,  he  argues  that  the  exchange  rate  is 
determined  by  relative  national  money  stocks  oper- 
ating  through  relative  price  levels.  This  means  that 
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minant  of  exchange  rates.  In  his words,  the  exchange 
rate  between  two  countries  “must  vary  as  the  quoti- 
ent  between  the  quantities  of  their  respective  circu- 
lating  media.”  [2,  p.  62] 
From  the  foregoing  he drew  two  implications.  The 
first  is  that  in  a  regime  of  floating  exchange  rates, 
inflation  is  entirely  homemade  and  cannot  be  im- 
ported  from  abroad.  “An  important  consequence  of 
the  . . . dependence  of  the  exchange  on  the  purchas- 
ing  power  parity,”  he  said,  “is  .  .  .  that  a  rise  in 
prices  in  a  foreign  country  can  never  cause  a  rise  in 
prices  at  home.”  [3,  p.  145]  For,  assuming  the 
exchange  rate  is  at  PPP, 
a  rise  in  prices  in  a  foreign  country  should  have 
no  other  effect  than  that  of  the  country’s  currency 
being  quoted  so  much  lower  that  the  prices  on 
goods  imported  therefrom  remain  unaltered.  If 
the  influence  of  the  rise  in  foreign  prices  is  carried 
further,  it  is  a  sign  that  it  has  found  support  in  an 
independent  domestic  inflation.  [3,  p.  167] 
In  sum,  a  rise  in  foreign  prices  will  be  offset  by  a 
corresponding  drop  in  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate 
leaving  the  price  of imports,  and  so the  domestic  price 
level,  unchanged.  If  the  domestic  price  level  does 
indeed  rise,  it  is  because  of  domestic  monetary  ex- 
pansion  and  not  the  rise  of  foreign  prices. 
The  second  implication  is  that  exchange  rate  de- 
preciation  itself  cannot  cause  domestic  inflation.  A 
rise  in  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate,  he  said,  is  the 
result,  not  the  cause,  of  domestic  inflation.  He  did 
acknowledge  that  a  rise  in  the  exchange  rate  above 
the  PPP  could  produce  import  price  increases.  But 
he  denied  that  these  import  price  increases  could  be 
transmitted  to  general  prices  provided  the  money 
stock  and  total  spending  were  held  constant.  He 
maintained  that,  given  a  fixed  money  stock,  the  rise 
in  the  particular  prices  of  imported  commodities 
would  be  offset  by  compensating  reductions  in  other 
prices  leaving  the  general  price  level  unchanged.  As 
he  put  it 
Only  if  the  B  currency  were  quoted  above  the  PPP 
could  the  high  price  of  this  currency  have  any 
influence  to  raise  the  prices  in  country  A.  But 
even  this  influence  would  not  be  able  to  raise  the 
general  price  level  unless  it  had  the  support  of  a 
more  plentiful  supply  of  means  of  payment  .  .  .  . 
[3,  p. 168] 
Ludwig  van  Mises  Rivaling  Cassel  as  the  prin- 
cipal  proponent  of  the  PPP  doctrine  in  the  1920’s 
was  the  famous  Austrian  economist  Ludwig  von 
Mises.  It  is not  necessary  to  give  a lengthy  summary 
of  his  writings  on  the  subject.  Three  quotations  will 
suffice.  The  first  refers  to  equalization  of  the  value 
of  money,  the  second  to  the  stability  of  equilibrium, 
and  the  third  to  the  causal  role  of  money- all  key 
propositions  of  the  PPP  doctrine.  Regarding  equali- 
zation  of  the  value  of  money,  he  states  that 
exchange  rates  must  eventually  be  established  at  a 
height  at  which  it  makes  no  difference  whether 
one  uses  a  piece  of  money  directly  to  buy  a  com- 
modity,  or  whether  one  first  exchanges  this  money 
for  units  of  a  foreign  currency  and  then  spends 
that  foreign  currency  for  the  desired  commodity. 
[9 p.  30] 
The  operation  of  the  self-equilibrating  mechanism 
is described  by  von  Mises  in  the  following  words. 
Should  the  rate  deviate  from  that  determined  by 
the  purchasing  power  parity  .  .  .  an  opportunity 
would  emerge  for  undertaking  profit-making  ven- 
tures.  It  would  then  be  profitable  to  buy  commodi- 
ties  with  the  money  which  is  legally  undervalued 
on  the  exchange,  as  compared  with  its  purchasing 
power  parity,  and  to  sell  those  commodities  for 
that  money  which  is  legally  overvalued  on  the 
exchange,  as  compared  with  its  actual  purchasing 
power.  Whenever  such  opportunities  for  profit 
exist,  buyers  would  appear  on  the  foreign  exchange 
market  with  a  demand  for  the  undervalued  money. 
This  demand  drives  the  exchange  up  until  it 
reaches  its  “final  rate”  [i.e.,  the  PPP].  [9,  pp. 
30-1] 
Finally,  with  respect  to  the  causal  role  of  money 
in the  determination  of  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate, 
he  states  the  “exchange  rates  rise  because  the  quan- 
tity  of  the  domestic  money  has  increased  and  com- 
modity  prices  have  risen.” [9, p. 31] 
Criticisms  of  the  PPP  Doctrine  Even  at  the 
height  of  its  popularity  in  the  1920’s  the  PPP  doc- 
trine  was  the  target  of  severe  criticism.  Critics  such 
as  Frank  Taussig,  J.  M.  Keynes,  A.  C.  Pigou,  and 
Jacob  Viner  contended  that  the  theory  suffered  from 
certain  crippling  defects.  For  one  thing,  it  overlooks 
factors  other  than  relative  price  levels  that  determine 
exchange  rates.  Consisting  of  the  terms  of  trade, 
obstacles  to  trade  (tariffs,  transport  costs  and  the 
like),  and  the  structure  of  prices  in  both  countries, 
these  factors  may  produce  a  permanent  disparity  be- 
tween  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate  and  the  calcu- 
lated  absolute  PPP.  Moreover,  their  movements 
over  time  tend  to  generate  a  persistent  discrepancy 
between  exchange  rate  movements  and  those  of  the 
PPP  thus  invalidating  the  relative  version  of  the 
doctrine.  For  example,  changes  in the  terms  of  trade 
caused  by  shifts  in  international  demand  would  pro- 
duce  permanent  changes  in  the  equilibrium  exchange 
rate  even  if  PPP  remained  unchanged.  Likewise 
changes  in tariffs  and  transport  costs  as well  as  alter- 
ations  in  the  relationship  between  export  prices  and 
general  prices  in  either  country  would  prevent  the 
equilibrium  exchange  rate  from  adhering  to  the  path 
dictated  by  PPP.  Discrepancies  may  also  stem  from 
the  existence  of  nontraded  (purely  domestic)  goods 
whose  prices  have  no  close  connection  with  the  ex- 
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levels  used  to  compute  the  PPP.  For  these  reasons 
the  critics  argued  that  the  doctrine  is incorrect  when 
applied  to  general  price  levels.  They  held  that  it  was 
valid  only  when  restricted  to  the  prices  of  interna- 
tionally  traded  goods  in  which  case,  to  use  Keynes’s 
expression,  it  becomes  a  “truism,  and  as  nearly  as 
possible  jejune.”  [7,  p.  75] 
Bresciani-Turroni’s  Critique  The  foregoing  criti- 
cisms  were  themselves  evaluated  in  a  famous  1934 
paper  by  the  Italian  economist  Costantino  Bresciani- 
Turroni.  In  what  is perhaps  the  most  rigorous  and 
systematic  analysis  of  the  PPP  doctrine  to  be  found 
in  the  economic  literature,  Bresciani-Turroni  con- 
cluded  (1)  that  the  absolute  version  of  the  doctrine 
is  indeed  generally  incorrect,  (2)  that  the  relative 
version,  however,  is  theoretically  correct  in  the  case 
of  monetary  but  not  real  shocks,  and  (3)  that,  as  an 
empirical  matter,  the  relative  version  may  be approxi- 
mately  correct  even  in  the  latter  case.  In  so  doing 
he  provided  a  masterful  defense  of  the  relative  ver- 
sion  of  the  theory. 
The  foregoing  conclusions  were  derived  by  Bres- 
ciani-Turroni  on  the  basis  of  a  simple  analytical 
model  which  he  constructed  via  the  following  steps. 
First,  he  assumed  that  tariffs,  transport  costs,  and 
other  obstacles  to  trade  tend  to  raise  the  supply  price 
of  each  country’s  exports  by  a certain  fraction.  Thus 
if  Px  and  are  the  domestic  prices  of  a  unit  of 
home  and  foreign  country  exportables,  respectively, 
and  t  and  t*  represent  the  fraction  by  which  those 
prices  are  raised  by  obstacles  to  trade,  then  the  total 
supply  prices  to  buyers  of  the  countries’  exports  will 
be  Px(l+t)  and  (1+t*),  respectively.  These 
expressions  state  that  the  price  of goods  in the  buying 
market  must  exceed  the  price  in  the  selling  market 
by  the  cost  of  transport  and  tariffs. 
Second,  he  argued  that  long-run  equilibrium  re- 
quires  that  the  total  value  of  each  country’s  exports 
be  exactly  equal  to  the  total  value  of  its  imports 
measured  in  terms  of  a  common  currency.  For  the 
home  country,  this  zero  trade  balance  equilibrium 
condition  can  be  expressed  as 
(7) QPx(l+t)  =  Q*Px*(l+t*)E 
where  Q  is  the  quantity  of  physical  exports  of  the 
home  country,  Q*  the  physical  quantity  of  its  im- 
ports  (i.e.,  the  quantity  of  the  foreign  country’s 
exports),  PX(l+t)  the  home  currency  supply  price 
(including  transport  costs)  of  home  country  exports, 
(1+t*)  the  foreign  currency  supply  price  of 
foreign  country  exports,  and  E  the  exchange  rate 
defined  as  the  home  currency  price  of  a  unit  of  for- 
eign  currency. 
Third,  he  assumed  that  the  domestic  price  of  each 
country’s  exportables  can  be  linked  to  general  price 
levels  P  and  P*  via  the  following  relationships 
(8)  Px  =  RP  and  =  R*P* 
where  R  and  R*  denote  the  equilibrium  ratio  of 
export  prices  to  general  prices  in  each  country,  as 
can  be  seen  by  expressing  the  equations  in  the  form 
R  =  Px/P  and  R*  =  /P*.  Representing  the 
equilibrium  relative  prices  of  exportables  in  terms  of 
general  price  levels  at  home  and  abroad,  these  equa- 
tions  summarize  the  equilibrium  structure  of  prices 
in  the  two  countries  concerned. 
Finally,  he  substituted  Equation  8 into  Equation  7 
and  solved  for  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate  thereby 
obtaining  the  expression 
which  says  that  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate  is  the 
product  of  four  determinants,  namely  the  unob- 
structed  barter  terms  of  trade,  relative  transport  and 
tariff  costs,  relative  price  structures,  and  the  PPP, 
respectively.  Regarding  these  determinants,  note 
that  the  terms  of  trade  variable  shows  the  quantity 
of  exports  the  home  country  must  give  up  in  the 
absence  of  tariff  and  transport  costs  to  obtain  a  unit 
of  imports  (the  other  country’s  exports)  and  thus 
represents  the  real  cost  of  obtaining  the  latter  in 
terms  of  the  amount  of  the  export  good  sacrificed. 
Determined  by  real  factors  such  as tastes,  technology, 
and  resource  endowments,  the  terms  of trade  variable 
captures  nonmonetary  influences  affecting  the  ex- 
change  rate. 
The  relative  tariff  and  transport  cost  variable 
shows  the  impact  on  the  exchange  rate  of  natural  and 
artificial  obstacles  to  trade.  Note  that  when  these 
obstacles  are  identical  both  for  exports  and  imports 
such  that  t=t*,  the  ratio  reduces  to  one  and  thus 
cannot  distort  the  exchange  rate  from  the  PPP.  Only 
if  trade  barriers  are  more  severe  in  one  direction 
than  another,  i.e.,  exports  and  imports  are  hampered 
unequally,  would  such  distortion  exist. 
The  remaining  determinants  can  be  summarized 
briefly.  The  price  structure  variable  compares  the 
relationship  between  export  prices  and  general  price 
levels  at  home  and  abroad.  Unless  both  countries 
possess  identical  price  structures,  this  determinant 
will  cause  a  persistent  discrepancy  between  the  equi- 
librium  exchange  rate  and  the  PPP.  Note  also  that 
the  price  structure  variable  is  determined  not  by 
monetary  but  by  real  factors  (e.g.,  tastes,  technology, 
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invariant  to  monetary  changes.  By  contrast,  the  PPP 
variable  is,  in  Bresciani-Turroni’s  own  words,  deter- 
mined  by  “the  monetary  conditions  particular  to  each 
country”  and  thus  varies  with  changes  in  relative 
money  stocks.  [1,  p.  93] 
On  the  basis  of  Equation  9,  Bresciani-Turroni 
reached  the  following  conclusions  regarding  the 
validity  of  the  PPP  theory.  First,  the  absolute  ver- 
sion  of  the  theory  is  generally  incorrect.  Evidently 
the  equilibrium  condition  is not  “exchange  rate  equals 
PPP”  but  rather  “exchange  rate  equals  PPP  multi- 
plied  by  the  terms  of  trade,  relative  obstacles  to 
trade,  and  relative  internal  price  structures.”  These 
other  things  may  cause  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate 
to  deviate  permanently  from  the  PPP. 
Second,  the  relative  version  of  the  doctrine  re- 
mains  valid  if  these  other  factors  are  constant.  That 
is,  other  things  remaining  the  same,  the  exchange 
rate  varies  equiproportionally  with  relative  price 
levels  as predicted  by  the  theory.  This  can  be  demon- 
strated  by  holding  the  other  factors  constant  in  Equa- 
tion  9 and  letting  the  PPP  double  or  quadruple.  The 
changes  in the  PPP  will  be matched  by  a correspond- 
ing  doubling  or  quadrupling  of  the  exchange  rate. 
Third,  whether  other  things  remain  the  same  de- 
pends  upon  whether  disturbances  emanate  from  the 
monetary  or  real  sectors  of  the  economy.  Purely 
monetary  disturbances  will  not  affect  the  long-run 
equilibrium  values  of  the  non-PPP  determinants  of 
the  exchange  rate.  These  determinants  are  real 
variables.  As  such  they  are  largely  invariant  to 
monetary  shocks.  In  long-run  equilibrium  the  latter 
affect  only  price  levels  and  the  PPP.  It  therefore 
follows  that  the  relative  version  of  the  theory  holds 
in  the  case  of  monetary  changes. 
Fourth,  in  sharp  contrast  to  purely  monetary  dis- 
turbances,  real  disturbances  will  indeed  alter  the 
non-PPP  determinants  of  the  exchange  rate,  thus 
producing  systematic  divergences  between  exchange 
rate  variations  and  those  of  the  PPP.  This  means 
that  the  relative  version  will  not  hold  exactly  in  the 
case  of  real  changes.  Nevertheless,  it  may  hold  at 
least  approximately  if the  real  effects  are  small.  And, 
according  to  Bresciani-Turroni,  that  is  exactly  what 
one  would  expect  to  find.  He  maintained  that  there 
are  limits  to  how  far  away  from  the  PPP  real  dis- 
turbances  can  distort  the  exchange  rate.  These  limits 
are  set  by  the  price  sensitivity  (elasticity)  of  inter- 
national  demands.  If  this  sensitivity  is  high,  then 
even  slight  deviations  from  PPP  will  invoke  large 
price-induced  shifts  in  trade  sufficient  to  check  fur- 
ther  deviations.  It  follows,  he  said,  that  “when  inter- 
national  demands  are  very  elastic,  which  happens  in 
the  case  of  modern  industrial  countries  with  a  con- 
siderable  resourcefulness  of  supply,”  the  influence 
of  real  changes  on  exchange  rates  is  “likely  to  be 
confined  within  narrow  limits.”  If  so,  “there  will  be 
for  exchange  rate  indexes  a  tendency  to  settle  at  a 
level  approximately  equal  to  the  ratio  of  .  .  .  price 
indexes.”  [1,  p.  122]  In  short,  provided  interna- 
tional  demand  elasticities  are  high,  the  relative  ver- 
sion  of  the  doctrine  remains  approximately  valid  even 
in  the  case  of  real  economic  changes. 
Finally,  mention  should  be  made  of  Bresciani- 
Turroni’s  rejection  of  the  so-called  commodity  arbi- 
trage  interpretation  of  PPP.  This  interpretation  sees 
PPP  as  an  extension  of  the  law  of  one  price,  accord- 
ing  to  which  the  operation  of  goods  arbitrage  equal- 
izes  the  common  currency  price  of  internationally- 
traded  goods  across  countries.  Since  this  reasoning 
only  applies  to  internationally  traded  goods,  its  pro- 
ponents  advocate  restricting  the  PPP  concept  solely 
to  the  prices  of  traded  goods. 
Bresciani-Turroni,  however,  emphatically  rejected 
this  interpretation  as  a  trivial  truism  devoid  of  eco- 
nomic  content.  He  argued  that  because  internation- 
ally-traded  goods  have  a  single  world  price,  their 
common  currency  prices  by  definition  must  every- 
where  be  the  same  (transport  costs  aside).  In  other 
words,  the  ratio  of  their  prices  in  domestic  currencies 
must,  shipping  costs  aside,  move  with  exchange  rates 
purely  as  a  matter  of  arithmetic.  Moreover,  since 
arbitrage  by  definition  equalizes  prices  of  traded 
goods  at  any  given  exchange  rate,  it  fails  to  explain 
how  a  unique  equilibrium  exchange  rate  is  deter- 
mined.  He,  of  course,  took  it  for  granted  that  arbi- 
trage  would  occur,  but  he  insisted  that  the  essence  of 
the  PPP  doctrine  was  not  the  law  of  one  price  but 
rather  the  notion  that  exchange  rates  accurately  re- 
flect  the  monetary  conditions  in  the  countries  con- 
cerned.  And  if  the  purpose  of  PPP  is  to  indicate 
relative  monetary  conditions,  then  one  should  com- 
pare  not  the  prices  of  traded  goods  alone  but  rather 
general  price  levels  that  measure  the  value  of  money. 
Friedman  and  Schwartz  The  principal  contribu- 
tion  to  the  PPP  doctrine  since  Bresciani-Turroni’s 
analysis  has  been  Milton  Friedman’s  and  Anna 
Schwartz’s  1963  generalization  of  the  price-induced 
PPP self-equilibratin  g  mechanism  to  apply  to  all 
items  in  the  balance  of  payments.  This  was  a  new 
development.  Prior  to  Friedman  and  Schwartz, 
stabilizing  price  pressures  were  viewed  as  operating 
solely  or  primarily  through  the  trade  accounts  alone. 
Cassel,  for  example,  argued  that  the  exchange  rate 
would  be  brought  into  conformity  with  PPP  via 
price-induced  changes  in  commodity  trade.  In  his 
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prices  at the  existing  exchange  rate  would,  by  making 
U.  S.  goods  twice  as  expensive  to  foreigners  and 
foreign  goods  half  as  expensive  to  Americans,  dis- 
courage  U.  S.  exports  and  encourage  U.  S.  imports 
thereby  resulting  in  an  increased  supply  of  dollars 
seeking  to  buy  a  reduced  supply  of  foreign  currency 
on  the  market  for  foreign  exchange.  The  resulting 
excess  demand  for  foreign  currency  and  the  corre- 
sponding  excess  supply  of  dollars  would  bid  the 
exchange  rate  to  double  its  original  level.  In  this 
way  changes  in  exports  and  imports  and  the  corre- 
sponding  shifts  in  the  supply  and  demand  for  foreign 
exchange  would  raise  the  exchange  rate  to  the  level 
dictated  by  PPP.  Thus,  in  the  traditional  view, 
price-induced  changes  in  commodity  trade  constitute 
the  primary  means  by  which  the  exchange  rate  is 
restored  to  the  PPP  equilibrium.4 
Friedman  and  Schwartz,  however,  argued  that 
such  adjustment  is  not  restricted  to  the  trade  ac- 
counts  alone.  In  particular,  price-induced  changes  in 
unilateral  transfers  and  capital  movements  also  play  a 
role.  Regarding  unilateral  transfers,  they  contended 
that  a  doubling  of  wages  and  prices  in  the  U.  S. 
relative  to  those  abroad 
would  mean  that  a  given  number  of  dollars  trans- 
ferred  by  immigrants,  for  example,  to  their  fami- 
lies  abroad  would  constitute  only  half  as  large  a 
fraction  of  the  immigrants’  wages  and  so  would 
tend  to  increase  the  amount  sent.  [5,  p.  61] 
On  the  market  for  foreign  exchange,  this  increased 
desire  to  make  unilateral  transfers  would  translate 
into  an  increased  supply  of  dollars  seeking  to  buy 
foreign  currencies,  thereby  putting  upward  pressure 
on  the  exchange  rate. 
The  same  holds  true  for  capital  flows.  Regarding 
such  flows,  Friedman  and  Schwartz  state  that,  given 
the  U.  K.  price  level  and  the  dollar/pound  exchange 
rate,  a  doubling  of  U.  S.  prices 
would  mean  that  a  given  number  of  pounds  sterling 
intended  for  capital  investment  in  the  United 
States  would  buy  only  half  as  much  physical  capital 
while  still  commanding  an  unchanged  amount  at 
home  and  so  would  discourage  capital  investment 
in  the  U.  S.  [5,  p.  61] 
On  the  market  for  foreign  exchange,  this  reluctance 
to  invest  in  the  U.  S.  would  be  reflected  in  a  reduced 
supply  of  pounds  seeking  to  buy  dollars.  Likewise, 
the  corresponding  increased  desire  of  Americans  to 
invest  in  Britain  would  be  manifested  in  an  increased 
supply  of  dollars  seeking  to  buy  pounds.  The  result- 
ing  excess  demand  for  pounds  and  the  corresponding 
4 Recall,  however,  that  in  Wheatley’s  view  income  adjust- 
ments  also  play  a  role. 
excess  supply  of  dollars  would  help  bid  the  exchange 
rate  up  toward  its  PPP  equilibrium.  In  this  manner 
the  self-equilibrating  mechanism  operates  through  the 
capital  account  as  well  as  the  current  account  of  the 
balance  of  payments.  More  generally,  since  all  items 
in  the  balance  of  payments  are  critically  dependent 
on  relative  national  price  levels,  all  contribute  to  the 
stability  of  PPP  equilibrium. 
Concluding  Comments  This  article  has  traced 
the  evolution  of  the  PPP  theory  of  exchange  rates 
from  its  initial  formulation  by  Thornton  and  Wheat- 
ley  in  the  early  1800’s  to  its  definitive  critique  and 
restatement  by  Bresciani-Turroni  in  the  mid-1930’s. 
It  is  now  time  to  summarize  the  views  of  current 
proponents  of  the  doctrine. 
With  the  exception  of  Friedman  and  Schwartz, 
modern  proponents  have  added  little  beyond  Bres- 
ciani-Turroni’s  analysis.  Like  him  they  hold  that  the 
long-run  behavior  of  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate 
is chiefly,  but  not  solely,  determined  by  the  behavior 
of  relative  money  stocks  operating  through  relative 
price  levels.”  Like  him  they  readily  acknowledge 
that  a  variety  of  factors-tariff  changes,  output  dis- 
turbances,  shifts  in  demand,  capital  movements  and 
the  like-impinge  on the  equilibrium  rate  and  force  it 
to  deviate  from  the  path  dictated  by  the  PPP.  And 
like  him  they  argue  that  price  parities  operate  to 
limit  these  deviations  and  hold  them  in  check.  In 
particular,  they  contend  that  divergences  from  PPP 
will  trigger  the  restraining  force  of  price-induced 
trade  and  capital  flows  that  arrest  further  deviations. 
For  example,  they  argue  that  real  factors  that  push 
the  external  value  of  a  currency  below  its  PPP  will 
inevitably  generate  price  incentives  tending  to  spur 
exports  and  check  imports.  The  resulting  trade  bal- 
ance  improvement  and  the  associated  strengthening 
of  demand  for  the  currency  on  the  foreign  exchanges 
will  halt  further  deviations  from  price  parity.  In 
this  manner,  the  PPP  mechanism  tends  to  constrain 
systematic  distortions  between  the  equilibrium  rate 
and  price  parity. 
The  same  mechanism,  proponents  note,  also  works 
to  correct  random  rate  variations  and  to  keep  the 
actual  rate  tending  toward  the  equilibrium  rate 
whether  or  not  the  latter  differs  from  PPP.  That  is, 
suppose  the  equilibrium  rate  is permanently  distorted 
from  price  parity  as  indicated  by  the  expression 
E  =  K (P/P*)  where  K  is  the  divergence  between 
the  two  variables.  Notwithstanding  this  distortion, 
the  self-corrective  mechanism  will  eliminate  all  devi- 
5 What  follows  draws  heavily  from  Yeager  [15,  pp.  210, 
214-23]. 
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completely  explains  equilibrium  exchange  rate  move- 
ments  stemming  from  purely  monetary  changes. 
Moreover,  they  contend  that  it  applies,  albeit  ap- 
proximately,  when  monetary  changes  dominate  real 
changes.  They  point  out  that  a  money-induced  rise 
in  the  PPP  tends  to  be  reflected  to  its  full  extent, 
without  modification,  in  the  exchange  rate.  By  con- 
trast,  a  real  shock  operating  through  the  balance  of 
payments  provokes  compensations  that  limit  its 
effect  on  the  exchange  rate.  In  the  long  run,  there- 
fore,  exchange  rate  movements  will  largely  reflect 
changes  in  relative  money  stocks  as  predicted  by  the 
theory.  For  these  reasons  proponents  hold  that  the 
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